I would like to thank Chatham House for inviting me to speak today on the future of NATO.
Today, NATO is a very active alliance. NATO, as a security alliance, has tens of thousands of personnel deployed on five different missions globally: In Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force, in Iraq with its NATO Training Mission there, in Kosovo as KFOR, in the eastern Mediterranean Sea as part of Operation Active Endeavour-the only Article V mission NATO is currently carrying out, and off the Horn of Africa fighting piracy as Operation Ocean Shield.
It maintains the rapid reaction NATO Response Force, which in theory, is a capability that can deploy 25,000 troops after five days' notice and sustain itself for operations lasting 30 days or longer, if resupplied. And it carries out more than a dozen annual training exercises to increase the military readiness of its members and its allies.
It is against this backdrop that the alliance is preparing the text of the next Strategic Concept. Indeed, the work on the Strategic Concept is well under way. Under the leadership of Madeleine Albright two out of the four Strategic Concept seminars have already been conducted-discussing matters such as NATO's role in the world, Afghanistan, and future threats.
Today, I want to consider five areas:
1) NATO's Purpose
2) NATO's external relationships
3) NATO's nuclear posture
4) NATO funding
And finally, NATO's mission in Afghanistan.
Strategic Concept - Priorities and Challenges
First, NATO's purpose. Since the close of the Cold War there has been a lot of talk and debate as to what NATO's role should be. NATO's involvement in the Balkans gave it new life in the late 1990's but its current role in Afghanistan since the U.S. led invasion there has been an awakening for many in the alliance.
NATO's mission in Afghanistan has created further debate on NATO's role and even, of NATO's survival as a defence alliance. To address some of the recent shortcomings of NATO we must get back to first principles. There have been countless speeches, articles, seminars and academic papers across Europe and North America asking the question: What is NATO for? During the Cold War NATO's two primary roles-political and military- were easily defined and separable. During the Cold War the military role of NATO was to provide continental defence against the Warsaw Pact and the spread of Communism. There was a clear military objective: on order, defeat the Soviet Union on the battlefields of central Europe-or at least delay the Soviet Forces until American reinforcements could arrive.
At the same time, NATO's political role provided Western democratic countries a platform on which they could stand and confront the USSR and communism in Europe. Here the objective was also clear: prevent the spread of communism into Western Europe. The luxury of the bi-polar world during the Cold War allowed us to make clear and distinct differences between these two roles.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union muddled the waters. However, the events of September 11th may have helped us answer the question of what NATO is for, even if we didn't notice it at the time.
The events of 9/11 and its aftermath have shown us that the 21st Century strategic environment demands that Western militaries are able to simultaneously conduct war fighting, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Furthermore, the post 9/11 world requires Western Governments to supplement these military operations through an array of soft power tools, such as international aid, diplomacy, and the spread of information and ideas. The challenge is to design a NATO than can help us deliver these capabilities.
Globalisation means that the West's economic and security interests are increasingly interlinked to others with an unavoidable shared set of interests and the unavoidable importation of strategic risk. As recent events have shown with the economic crisis, instability in one corner of the globe can quickly affect everyone. This interdependence will have major implications on how we organise our national (and international) security structures and identify our threats. Leaders in NATO must demonstrate a degree of political clarity in resolving political issues that underline military operations in the face of determined threats. However, this will not be enough. The agreement of political aims by the various members in NATO must be equally matched with military capability to follow through.
Leaders in NATO must work together to identify future threats that are in all our security interests. Strong arguments can be made that Article V needs to be expanded to cover new 21st century threats such as energy security or cyber terrorism. These threats are not going away, in fact they are proliferating and something will have to be done to address them. Recent NATO Summit's have failed to translate communiqués and sound bites into action and there has been too much focus on membership instead of the institutional reform much needed by the alliance. Perhaps it is the inconvenient truth that NATO, as a 21st Century Security Alliance in a very dangerous world, must be able to carry out expeditionary warfare and continental defence simultaneously. This is no easy task.
NATO's external relations
Today, we live in a multi-polar world where the preferred method of dealing with threats and challenges is through international consensus. How NATO engages with external actors is just as important as military capability-especially in areas directly impacting Europe's security. For example, NATO's relations with the EU and the United Nations are vital-especially in theatres of operation like Afghanistan, or counter piracy operations off Africa. But these relations need to be improved.
Does it make sense that in Afghanistan NATO lacks a formal agreement with the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan? Or still doesn't have a formal relationship agreed with the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan?
In Afghanistan we expect NATO, the EU, and the United Nations to epitomise the so-called "comprehensive approach". Yet, there is no formal relationship between them. In particular, NATO's relationship with the EU will have to be examined post-Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty has huge implications for the future of the EU's military role. Many aspects offer a direct and indirect challenge to NATO's primacy in European defence matters. As the EU aims to take on a greater role in security with deeper defence integration, what will this mean for NATO's role in Europe's defence? You may ask, why does any of this matter? It matters because I believe that NATO, which has been the cornerstone of our defence for 60 years should continue to have primacy.
Conservatives have always been happy for the EU to have a delivery role in defence policy under the NATO umbrella. But NATO must have the right of first refusal for all military and defence matters pertaining to the security of Europe. What about NATO's other relationships? NATO's relationship with Russia must be one built on the foundation of shared and common interests but also based on realism and pragmatism.
There is plenty of scope for cooperation between Russia and NATO and we should take advantage of this. Countering piracy, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating Islamic extremism, and Arctic Security are all areas where Russia and NATO have a shared set of interests. The latter in particular-Arctic security-is an area in which I would like to see more NATO involvement in the future and I hope the Strategic Concept promotes this view. Four out of the five arctic powers are in NATO and Russia is the fifth. This area cannot be neglected.
I welcome the recent agreement on a NATO-Russia Council work program for 2010 and that NATO and Russia have agreed to review common security challenges of the 21st century in a document which will be produced by the end of 2010. If they haven't already, I hope that representatives of the Strategic Concept will visit officials in Russia to hear their views. NATO must also continue to engage with allies outside the natural Atlantic Sphere. Contact Countries such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan are particularly important-especially in the context of Afghanistan and regional security. NATO must also leave its door open for those countries that fulfil the demanding criteria for membership.
No non-NATO country can ever, will ever, or should ever have a veto on any NATO aspirant.
This is why it is important to engage with aspirant countries like Georgia-a country that is key to regional security and will soon be sending almost 1,000 troops to Afghanistan, most to Helmand Province-to assure them that the NATO door isn't closed if they meet the criteria. We must also ensure that new member states like Albania and Croatia (and soon Montenegro) continue down the same path which led them to NATO membership to begin with. NATO must continue to build on the success of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative -both allow engagement between NATO and some of the most unstable regions of the world. Using the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative NATO must continue to build and nurture relations with the Gulf States.
Nuclear Posture
The multi-polarity of the post Cold War world means that events are often unpredictable and quickly changing. No one can accurately predict the threats the alliance will face in the next 50 years just as no one 20 years ago could have anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Union, or the nature of the conflicts which currently confront us in Afghanistan or Iraq. The threat associated with proliferation of nuclear weapons makes the world even more dangerous. This is why it is important that NATO maintains a "nuclear culture" and that this is reflected as explicitly as possible in the upcoming Strategic Concept.
NATO's previous Strategic Concept in 1999 stated that:
"The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies." (paragraph 62)
This is one aspect of the previous Strategic Concept that I hope will remain in the new one. Since 1999 the world has experienced more, not less, nuclear proliferation-especially with North Korea and Iran. In addition to the nuclear capabilities of France and the United Kingdom, the Americans have between 180-240 nuclear weapons (depending on which unofficial authority you believe) based in Europe in at least five different countries for use by non-nuclear NATO members in the event of a nuclear war.
There has been some talk in a few of the countries where these weapons are based about the possibility of removing them because they are viewed as a throwback to the days of the Cold War and irrelevant to today's security challenges. But as stated in the 1999 Strategic Concept, nuclear weapons are "The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies." This was the case in 1999 and I believe that this is even more so the case today.
At the end of the day it is up to each individual member state if they choose to have American nuclear weapons on their soil or not. I only ask that when these decisions are made, they are made considering the best interests of the alliance as a whole in a very unpredictable world. Nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented; they will remain part of the international security picture in the near and long term future. Believing anything else is a dream. The onus is not on those of us who wish to maintain a "nuclear culture" inside the alliance, but on those who want to scrap it, to tell us why they believe that they can predict the risks that we will face in the future.
We want to continue to work to address the existence of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which is an integral part of efforts to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons and a fundamental commitment under the NPT. Showing that we take our disarmament commitments seriously is a vital part of winning the moral argument against nuclear proliferation. Britain has an excellent record. However no amount of nuclear disarmament will protect us from the dangers of nuclear weapons without a more comprehensive approach to nuclear proliferation, which is by far the biggest challenge we face today.
This is why a future Conservative Government will maintaining Britain's round the clock, independent, submarine based, and strategic nuclear deterrent in the spirit of the Non Proliferation Treaty. Currently, France is the only member of the alliance that doesn't participate in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group-the body inside NATO that takes decisions on the Alliance's nuclear policy. I would like to see this change in the future. As one of the three nuclear powers in the alliance, France has a natural place in the NPG and its participation would make the alliance stronger. I hope we will see that soon.
NATO Funding
Many may be surprised that I would consider funding at the same level of importance as NATO's nuclear posture or NATO's purpose but the current economic crisis has forced decision makers to bring this matter to the forefront. From a British point of view this is a very important matter.
Let me paint a picture of the Ministry of Defence's finances. According to the Gray Review, the initially suppressed and damning report on the MoD's procurement programme, the current defence equipment programme is underfunded to the tune of £35 billion and is running an average five years behind schedule. In fact, expected cost overruns in the next 10 years alone amount to £16bn. This equates to unfunded liability of £4.4 million per day. This is just one example of what the next Government will inherit.
For NATO to work properly as a security alliance in the post Cold War world NATO members must have:
- the willingness to take equal risks with regards to supplying troops and equipment within the alliance in support of NATO led military operations and;
- the willingness to financially fund and sustain these operations until the mission is completed.
Do we have both of these today in Afghanistan? Neither the financial burden nor the fighting burden is shared between NATO allies. NATO members need to understand that membership brings implicit and explicit responsibilities to ensure that their militaries have the capability to fight and win on the modern-day battlefield.
One of the areas that I believe needs to be addressed is the "fighting/funding gap" we currently have in NATO. At the moment, those who do the fighting also do the funding. Currently, there is common funding for a small amount of any NATO led military operation. This common funding covers shared costs such as headquarters, etc. and is linked to the member state's GDP. However, this common funding usually covers a very small total of the overall cost of an operation.
All other costs associated with NATO operations use the "costs lie where they fall" system. The more troops and equipment one contributes to a particular operation the more one ends up paying. For example, the cost to the UK for its contribution to the NATO operation in Afghanistan totals approximately £9.1 billion since 2001-more than the annual GDP of Albania. Obviously, this is a heavy burden on the British taxpayer under the current economic circumstances. Because of the expeditionary nature of NATO operations the "costs lie where they fall" system is an anachronism in the post Cold War era.
In April 2007, the leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron, set out in a speech here why we should set up a real operational fund for expeditionary missions with every member state being required to contribute. It would allow some reimbursement for those carrying a disproportionate cost and offer potential funding to those who might deploy forces but face short term financial difficulties.
Why should the few carry the many? Common security implies common commitment. It is quite wrong for everyone in the street to get the same insurance policy when only a few pay the premiums. I imagine the day is not far off when our taxpayers will be demanding a fairer system of finance for military operations. This is completely rational.
Collective security alliances are just that-collective. It is time that everyone contributed their fair share to the common good and I hope this matter is addressed in the upcoming Strategic Concept, but I am not too optimistic.
Afghanistan
NATO members must take advantage of America's renewed focus on Afghanistan as a way to translate rhetoric into action. The NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said it best last week when he said: "this is not just America's war, this is an Alliance mission". He added that "at this very important moment, NATO must demonstrate its unity and its strength once again." I could not agree more.
In a war you need to be committed to winning, not just disengaging as soon as possible. It is the duty of our political leaders to explain to the British people the national security threats that compel us to be in Afghanistan. This needs to be done with clarity, conviction and consistency.
If we expect the public to invest in the price of victory we must tell them the cost of defeat. It would be a shot in the arm for every violent jihadist across the globe as they came to the realisation that we did not have the moral fortitude to see off what we had ourselves described as a fundamental threat to our security.
It would also cause immense strains inside the NATO alliance with who knows what consequences. Of course, fracturing the Alliance is one of the aims of our enemies. They would like nothing better than a splintered NATO where the US became disillusioned or even walked away. So, how should we proceed as a coalition? How do we make sense of a campaign which has politically run aground and how do we describe it to our sceptical publics? Taking the public with us is vital to give resilience to the mission. Our enemies know that the ultimate asymmetry is that in democratic societies we must fight the political war at home as well as the military war abroad- a problem the Taliban, Al Qaeda or any other extremists do not have.
We must begin by describing our military objectives. The counter-insurgency plan set out by General McChrystal was a thoughtful and compelling one. It must start with giving greater priority to protecting the public than simply killing insurgents. We promised them a level of protection that has not materialised so little wonder they question our commitment. In the villages of Afghanistan.
We must protect them intimidation and coercion-from the so-called night letters of the Taliban- so that trust in our forces and our motives leads to the greater intelligence which is the precursor of greater security. We must mentor, train and enable the Afghan National Security Forces so that they can manage their own internal and external security.
We must, at the same time, minimise and, if possible, eliminate the destructive influences which will undermine this effort- corruption within government, the profiteering of the narcotics trade and the malign influence of those states and organisations who fund, arm or otherwise support the insurgents.
On the positive side we also need support the pillars and institutions of the Afghan state, improving and simplifying the organs of government, increasing its efficiency, accountability and transparency. Good governance, no more than human rights or education, was not why we went to Afghanistan but progress in these areas- the extension and improvement of governance- are vital in creating the long term stability which will consolidate military success.
Afghanistan is in a different position from when it was occupied by the soon- to-collapse Soviet Union. China is now a powerful regional player and Afghanistan's huge mineral wealth will be an attractive partner for a nation hungry for natural resources.
The large Afghan diaspora contains many of the professional skills that the country needs if they can be tempted back by greater stability and prosperity. The emergence of globalisation offers a proliferation of marketsand investors once basic levels of education and skills emerge. It is quite conceivable to see a stable Afghanistan as a net contributor to the global economy before too long.
There is a great prize and many opportunities to be had if we have the courage, skill and wisdom to realise them.
Success in Afghanistan will be achieved when we have a stable enough Afghanistan, able to manage its own internal and external security to a degree that stops interference from outside powers and allowing the country to resist the establishment of terror bases and the training camps that were there before. I believe the goal of security is achievable.
The current war in Afghanistan in that context is winnable. And that NATO has a leading role to play which includes creating the security conditions for reconstruction and improved governance to flourish and by training the Afghan National Security Forces so that they can one day take over the responsibility of keeping their country safe.
We must all do our part.
NATO members must live up to their commitments.
While America and the UK have now sent approximately 70,000 troops to Afghanistan, the 41 other coalition countries have managed just 27,874 between them. I am pleased that the Secretary General announced last week that "in 2010, the non-US members of this mission will send at least 5 000 more soldiers and probably more." I really hope these troops will become a reality- and they deploy where they most needed by commanders to carry out a mission required for success and not just where it is most politically acceptable back at home. I have to admit that I am not too optimistic.
At Strasburg we were promised 5,000 extra troops for the recent elections and by the time of the elections only half showed up. In fact, it has been reported in the media that some of the new troops being pledged by European countries are already in Afghanistan, having been sent to provide security for recent elections, and won't withdraw as planned.
Conclusion
What does all of this mean for NATO Transformation?
If NATO is to succeed as a modern security alliance it will need the capability and flexibility to continuously adapt to new challenges and threats. NATO's transformation must be based on this premise and the next Strategic Concept must reflect this reality. Allied Command Transformation, the body inside NATO responsible for carrying out the task of transformation, states in its mission statement very clearly that transformation must ensure the "military relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance". Due to global circumstances NATO does have relevance in the 21st Century. The alliance's capabilities are only as good as its members. It is up to its members to ensure that NATO's relevance is maintained and it has the capability to face new threats.
That is why it is vital to do what we can to make NATO work. It has been the cornerstone of our defence for sixty years and although in need of renovation, it is not ready for demolition. We need to get away from an idea that burden sharing in Afghanistan means that we all must take a share in everything we do militarily. It is an attractive but ultimately unrealistic aim. There is little point in NATO summits concentrating heavily on the frustrations about who is failing to live up to their promises even if it is entirely understandable. There are some (though only some) member states who have genuine historical and constitutional difficulties with fighting expeditionary warfare. Others are better equipped and militarily experienced for expeditionary capability but may want to divest themselves of Cold War legacy programmes.
We need to stop the sterile approach which has resulted in tasks being undertaken in a sub optimal way.
A balanced, creative and constructive approach to burden sharing will be needed if the alliance is to adapt to the challenges of the 21st Century.
We need to encourage all members to do more of what they can do within the constitutional, political and military constraints they have. There is no excuse for those who can contribute but don t - and they have to ask themselves whether they are serious about their membership- but we must ultimately accept that the strength of NATO is greater than the sum of its parts. Global change is occurring at a rapid rate. Change is being forced upon us. In the sphere of security NATO needs to stay ahead of the curve-changing if we wish to stay ahead of the threats.
In the United Kingdom the Conservative Party has been calling for a Strategic Defence and Security Review for more than three years and we have pledged to hold one immediately upon coming into office.
We have also committed to holding regular reviews-maybe NATO should do the same with its Strategic Concept?
The challenge for all NATO members will be to take the findings of their respective defence reviews and tie them into NATO's larger strategic objectives. In a perfect world, this would be the best way for each member state to maximise the usefulness of NATO. NATO is the link-the bridge-between Europe and North America. Most importantly is keeps America involved in Europe's defence. Something that Europe cannot afford-either literally or figuratively-to lose. Because of NATO's shortcomings in Afghanistan, and the increasing focus on EU defence initiatives by many of our European allies, there has been some debate here in the UK about whether Britain's future is best served with NATO.
Even with its shortcomings I still believe that we should not turn our back on an alliance that has underpinned the security of Western Europe and the United Kingdom for the last 60 years. With the current struggle in Afghanistan, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the threat of global terrorism, piracy, problems with energy security, and persistent cyber attacks the stakes are too high. In order to successfully face the threats of the 21st century, NATO is the only way forward.