Labour’s National Security Strategy notes that terrorism claimed in the name of Islam ‘does not at present amount to a strategic threat’1. This assessment is wrong. It is based on the assumption that the threat posed by extremist ideology is primarily physical, thereby treating it as a technical challenge to be addressed by taking protective measures against, and targeting, the physical manifestation of extremism – violence.
Security measures, investigative capacities and military intervention capabilities must of course be improved to protect us against the risk of violent attacks. This is because violent extremism will continue to manifest itself over the long-term from two potent sources.
First, Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has proved to be adaptable and resilient after being driven from Afghanistan. It has reconstituted itself in the tribal areas of Pakistan. It has been able to forge links with groups in other regions. And it has demonstrated a continued capacity to plan and co-ordinate sophisticated attacks – though more vigilant security services and measures have helped thwart them. Al Qaeda also continues to inspire self-starting, autonomous groups. The threat from Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda-inspired groups manifests itself against UK interests both at home and abroad. Domestically, Eliza Manningham-Buller, then Director General of the Security Service, said publicly in November 2006 that the Service was monitoring 30 plots involving some 200 groups and 1,600 individuals. By November 2007 her successor, Jonathan Evans, was saying that at least 2,000 individuals had become involved. Abroad, there are reports that radicalised British citizens are actively supporting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in attacks on British soldiers in Afghanistan.
The second potent source of terrorism is from state-sponsored groups. The clearest example is Hizbollah, which is sponsored by Iran. And Hamas, though Sunni, also receives support from the Shia theocracy.
Both sources of terrorism have an influence on the other. Hamas and Hizbollah make the resolution of the Israeli-Palestine and Arab-Israeli conflicts more difficult. Al Qaeda then exploits the continuing conflict as part of its campaign and recruitment efforts. We must work to resolve these conflicts. Thus, UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701 which require Hizbollah to disarm must be implemented. And Hamas must adhere to the Quartet conditions: it must abandon violence, recognise Israel and accept all previous agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Israel needs to keep to the commitments it has made, including continuing Ariel Sharon’s work of dismantling settlements. Resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict and developing stable democratic institutions in Lebanon will be foreign policy priorities for a Conservative Government.
But we must not be deluded into thinking that these two conflicts are the central causes of terrorism. Extremists base their propaganda on other conflicts and grievances as well. For the UK the real problem is not, therefore, just violence. We face a strategic problem from those who have, through selective quotation, brought about the rejection of traditional scholarship and the intimidation of theological opponents, abusing the religion of Islam to fabricate a politicised ideology which they falsely identify with the entirety of the faith. This ideology is adaptable in creating and exploiting false linkages between fundamentalist goals and local conditions. It is propagated by individuals and groups that, though often acting as ‘gateways’ for political violence or aiming to make the West an illiberal place, operate within the bounds of democratic procedure and are careful to stay within the law. Labour’s ‘Prevent’ Strategy does not recognise this: its focus is on tackling ‘violent extremism’, rather than extremism as a whole.
Tackling extremism is perhaps more of a challenge than targeting its violent manifestation. It is almost a case of fighting an “invisible” subversion. This task is made all the more difficult by technological advances such as the use of the internet. What we need to do is develop and implement a strategic counter-narrative.
A counter-narrative is developed by, firstly, understanding and countering processes of radicalisation and, secondly, encouraging mainstream Muslims to speak out against extremism. The Government has a key role to play in facilitating engagement to produce this counter-narrative. As in foreign policy, where it takes care not to endow terrorist groups with standing by conducting public negotiations, it must perform due diligence on the groups it engages with at home. The Government must deny public funding, including local authority funding, to extremist organisations. It must not give self-appointed groups privileged access to Government and policy-making – its engagement with Muslim communities, for example, must be premised on liberal democratic values and involve both individuals and local faith groups. The Government must also keep divisive and inflammatory preachers out of the country and apply vigorously existing anti-incitement legislation against violence and racism. Finally, it must not continue to maintain a false distinction between the social/charitable and military wings of extremist organisations such as Hizbollah and Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Such organisations must be banned in their entirety.
Creating a united response across communities to counter radicalisation and promote integration will take time. The fact that there are no quick fixes makes getting in place a long term comprehensive strategy against extremism in all its manifestations all the more urgent. Just as priority will be given by a Conservative government to foreign policy issues affecting security so it will focus strongly on preserving a secure and open society at home.
1. Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy (London: The Stationary Office, March 2008), p. 11